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FEDERAL LAND USE CONTROLS FOR CLEAN AIR 
By Kathleen King* 
INTRODUCTION 
The federal government has been involved in air pollution control 
since 1955.1 Unti11970, the federal approach had been to study the 
dimensions of the air pollution problem and to encourage, through 
technical and financial assistance, state efforts to control pollution. 
However, in 1970, Congress recognized that air pollution had be-
come a serious problem and that: 
the growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution brought about 
by urbanization, industrial development and the increasing use of motor 
vehicles, has resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and 
welfare, including injury to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to 
and the deterioration of property and hazards to air and ground trans-
portation.2 
This recognition of the critical nature of the air pollution problem 
resulted in the enactment of the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments,3 
which changed the federal role from one of minimal involvement to 
one of aggressive leadership. 
Because the Clean Air Amendments have been the subject of 
extensive analysis in both legal and environmental journals,4 this 
article does not attempt to deal comprehensively with the Act. 
Rather it focuses on the legal problems which result from a some-
what subtle mandate appearing in Section 110 of the Act: that land 
use and transportation controls be used as pollution control strate-
gies by the states.5 When read in the context of the federal govern-
ment's involvement in the promulgation of state air pollution 
plans,8 such a requirement expands federal powers to encompass 
traditionally local decisions such as zoning. 
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court in Fri v. Sierra Club7 
recently upheld a Federal District Court ruling that the Clean Air 
Act, by implication, embodies a policy of non-degradation. Non-
degradation, as explained by the lower court, means that the quality 
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of air in a given area should not be allowed to "significantly deterio-
rate" regardless of more lenient standards under the Act. In effect-
ing such a policy, the federal government will have to encroach 
further on the traditional right of state and local governments to 
regulate development. 
The expansion of federal involvement in air pollution control has 
occurred because both the Congress and the public have recognized 
that air pollution has national as well as local aspects.s Thus, al-
though air pollution control was originally thought to be a responsi-
bility of the states, in the late 1960's Congress found that the states 
were not effectively controlling air pollution.9 As the dynamic na-
ture of the atmosphere allows polluted air to travel across state 
lines,lo Congress relied on its broad powers under the commerce 
clause to deal with the problem in the Clean Air Act. ll 
In recognition of the national aspects of the air pollution problem, 
the 1970 Clean Air Act sets out uniform national standards of air 
quality, which are necessary to effect at least minimum standards 
of air quality in all parts of the country .12 The Act recognizes that 
if air quality standards are not nationally determined, they may 
differ from state to state, creating "polluter havens" where stan-
dards are lenient. 13 
The basic framework for administering the Clean Air Act is the 
device of primary and secondary ambient air quality standards 
which quantify the goals of the Clean Air Act. These standards are 
set by the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA]14 and the 
states must achieve them within a specified time period. 15 As de-
fined by the Act, primary ambient air quality standards are ". . . 
standards the attainment of which. . . allowing an adequate mar-
gin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health."18 Similarly, 
secondary ambient air quality standards". . . shall specify a level 
of air quality the attainment and maintenance of which . . . is 
requisite to protect the public welfare from any known or antici-
pated adverse effects associated with the presence of such pollu-
tant(s) in the ambient air."17 
Thus, primary and secondary ambient air quality standards are 
numerical levels of pollution below which public health and welfare 
are protected from adverse effects. They are national non-variablels 
standards which all states must meet. 
The definitional connection of primary and secondary standards 
with the protection of health and welfare is critical. As a conse-
quence of this connection, any program designed to maintain the 
quality of air which is cleaner than secondary standards must be 
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based on considerations other than health and welfare. The power 
of Congress to regulate these other considerations is one of the major 
difficulties in construing the basic policy of the Clean Air Act to be 
non-degradation. 
1. THE FRI DECISION: NON-DEGRADATION AND THE CLEAN Am ACT 
In Fri. u. Sierra Club, the Supreme Court affirmed, 4-4, and with-
out opinion, the holding of the Federal District Court of the District 
of Columbia that the 1970 Clean Air Act is based on a policy of non-
degradation of existing clean air, i.e., keeping clean air cleanY Al-
though the decision itself does not comment on the merits and is of 
weak precedential value, it is significant because it allows the rea-
soning and holding of the lower court to stand as a resolution of the 
issues. On its face, the Fri decision states that the authority of the 
Clean Air Act extends to the protection of clean air even if health 
and welfare are not involved. 
It is useful to look at the decision itself to understand how the 
court came to its conclusion. The Sierra Club brought the suit under 
Section 304, the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act which 
states: "any person may commence a civil action on his own be-
half-... against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure 
of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this Act 
which is not discretionary with the Administrator."2o The theory of 
the action was that the Administrator was failing to perform a non-
discretionary duty by his failure to require that state implementa-
tion plans assure no significant deterioration of clean areas. The 
District Court agreed with the Sierra Club and enjoined the Admin-
istrator from approving state plans which would not prevent signifi-
cant deterioration of the air. It also ordered him to review previously 
approved plans, and to disapprove those which would not have pre-
vented deterioration of the air. The Administrator was further or-
dered to promulgate regulations to guide the states in the preven-
tion of deterioration. 21 
The Clean Air Act does not explicitly state the policy of non-
degradation. However, the lower court issued the injunction because 
it concluded that the Act implicitly includes a policy of non-
degradation of clean air. Non-degradation is a term of art which 
means simply that under no circumstances will the existing air 
quality in a given area be permitted to deteriorate.22 Non-
degradation is to be implemented by the technique of preventing 
significant deterioration. A "no significant deterioration" standard 
implies some flexibility because presumably some deterioration is 
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acceptable until it reaches significant proportions. The lower court 
in Fri, however, used both terms interchangeably in the decision. 
The injunction was framed in terms of no significant deterioration, 
but the policy of the Act was discussed in terms of non-
degradation. 23 
While the court rested its decision on statutory construction, the 
real concern may have been that without a non-degradation policy, 
a "clean air" statute does not make sense. Without a non-
degradation policy, the Clean Air Act would authorize clean areas 
to become polluted, at least to the limit of secondary standards, and 
cause a "graying of America."24 Factories and other developments 
unable to locate in already polluted areas would be free to locate in 
clean areas, making urban sprawl and increased rural development 
inevitable. Thus, the alternative to a nondegradation policy is a 
"clean air" statute which allows clean air to become dirty and recog-
nizes a right to pollute the air up to secondary standards. If this 
policy argument is the real basis for the court's decision, however, 
the decision is perhaps answering questions which Congress should 
answer by clarifying the Clean Air Act through amendment. 25 
To find a policy of non-degradation, the District Court looked to 
the introductory language of the Act which states: "The purposes 
of this subchapter are to protect and enhance the quality of the 
Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare 
and the productive capacity of its population."26 (emphasis added). 
On its face, the term protect means keeping clean areas clean; the 
term enhance means making clean the polluted areas. To the lower 
court in Fri, this language embodied a non-degradation policy.27 
The court found support in the legislative history for its reading 
of the language.28 Specifically, the District Court cited the Senate 
Public Works Committee Report: "In areas where current air pollu-
tion levels are already equal to and better than the air quality goals, 
the Secretary should not approve any implementation plan which 
does not provide to the maximum extent practicable for the contin-
ued maintenance of such ambient air quality.' '29 This language sup-
ports a non-degradation construction to some extent, but the words 
"to the maximum extent practicable" imply that the practicalities 
of a situation may override the air quality interests. 
Furthermore, as then Administrator Ruckelshaus said in the 1972 
hearings on the implementation of the Act, this language came out 
before either a time frame for achieving air quality goals or the idea 
of a secondary standard was incorporated into the Act. 30 Mr. 
Ruckelshaus further pointed out that a non-degradation policy 
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does not make sense in the context of air quality standards which 
by definition protect against all adverse effects of pollution.31 
The case of Izaak Walton League of America v. St. Clair,32 pres-
ents a problem which parallels the Fri situation to a certain extent, 
and the reasoning of the Federal District Court of Minnesota in that 
case parallels the Fri approach to the policy of the Clean Air Act. 
In Walton, plaintiffs challenged defendants' mining activities in the 
Boundary Waters Canoe Area (BWCA), which is officially desig-
nated as a Wilderness Area. Plaintiffs argued that even though the 
mining activities were expressly allowed by the Wilderness Act,33 
such activities were inconsistent with the stated objectives of the 
Wilderness Act, namely, the preservation of wilderness areas. 34 The 
court agreed with the plaintiffs and enjoined defendants' mining 
activities.35 
The District Court in Walton was confronted with a wilderness 
preservation statute which by its own terms would allow mining in 
wilderness areas. The District Court in Fri was confronted with a 
clean air statute which, without a non-degradation policy, would 
allow clean air to become polluted. The court in Walton handled the 
problem by holding that the policy statement of the Wilderness Act 
had to control:38 "The court is aware of the general rule of construc-
tion that the specific controls the general and that the provision 
relating to mineral rights are (sic) more specific. Nevertheless, if the 
Act means anything, the BWCA was established by Congress to 
secure for future generations the beauty, pristine quality and primi-
tiveness of one of the few remaining small areas of this country"37 
(emphasis added). Thus the court in Walton gave a broad construc-
tion and overriding significance to the general policy language of the 
Wilderness Act. 
Similarly, the District Court in Fri gave a broad construction and 
overriding significance to the "protect and enhance" language of the 
Clean Air Act. Even though the non-degradation construction was 
not supported by express language in the Act, without that con-
struction the Clean Air Act would allow clean air to become pol-
luted. Thus the courts in both Walton and Fri relied on the purpose 
language of the respective statutes in order to strengthen the ulti-
mate goal of each statute. 
One difficulty with the Fri opinion is that Congress could have 
directly stated a non-degradation policy if that was their intent.3S 
Other pollution legislation, namely the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972 (FWPCA),39 has used direct lan-
guage to announce a non-degradation policy.40 
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The FWPCA is a useful comparison because of the similarities 
between the air and water pollution problems and because the fed-
eral action taken to combat both problems is similar. Water and air 
both can be polluted by emissions of dirt and waste. Both problems 
have a national aspect and a local aspect; the solution of both prob-
lems requires federal standard setting and state standard imple-
mentation. Indeed under the FWPCA, as under the Clean Air Act, 
the EPA administrator has the exclusive authority to establish and 
revise standards of quality,41 and the states have the responsibility 
to implement and enforce these standards. 42 
The crucial difference between the FWPCA and the Clean Air Act 
arises from the standard which each Act requires. As has been dis-
cussed, the standards of the CleanAir Act are minimum ambient air 
quality standards. 43 The standard of the FWPCA, in contrast, is a 
no-discharge policy,44 which is essentially a non-degradation policy 
for water. Prior to 1972, the FWPCA established water quality stan-
dards which were analogous to the current ambient standards under 
the Clean Air Act, but Congress adopted the no-discharge standard 
in 1972 because the water quality standards approach had not been 
effective.45 Under the new no-discharge policy, water quality is an 
interim measure of program effectiveness and performance, but no-
discharge is the ultimate goal and standard. 46 The effectiveness of 
the no-discharge policy has yet to be seen, but its statement in the 
Act is clear. The FWPCA states that "It is the national goal that 
the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated 
by 1985," that". . . the discharge of any pollutant by any person 
shall be unlawful," and that a standard of performance under the 
Act includes, " ... a standard permitting no discharge of pollu-
tants."47 Indeed, as the Senate Public Works Committee Report on 
the FWPCA pointed out, the Act made it clear that no one has the 
right to pollute, and that pollution continues because of technologi-
cal limitations, not because of any inherent right to use waterways 
for disposing of wastes. 48 Thus, as the FWPCA illustrates, a non-
degradation standard can be specifically stated and established as 
the basic framework of a pollution control act. The Clean Air Act 
does not do this. 
Another difficulty with the non-degradation gloss in the Clean Air 
Act is the serious inequalities it may create among the states. The 
major impact of a non-degradation policy will fall on areas of rela-
tively clean air. In polluted areas, or those areas which presently do 
not meet secondary standards, the present emphasis must be on 
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reducing existing pollution. With control technology rapidly im-
proving, these areas should be able to achieve secondary standards 
in the near future. As this air becomes cleaner, new developments 
and their concomitant pollution should be allowed, as long as sec-
ondary standards are not violated.49 
Clean areas, on the other hand, will have to maintain their cur-
rent air quality. As a result, their economic development will proba-
bly be restricted, because even with improved technology, any 
major development is likely to adversely affect the air quality in a 
clean air region. Under a policy of preventing significant deteriora-
tion, these clean areas have little potential for heavy industrial de-
velopment, and even residential or commercial development may be 
seriously restricted. If Congress had intended to treat different areas 
differently because of their current air quality, it probably would 
have set up a specific mechanism for so doing in the Act tself. 
Nevertheless, at present the holding in Fri is law. 
II. THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND LAND USE CONTROLS 
The Fri decision requires that the non-degradation policy be 
achieved specifically through state implementation plans.50 The sec-
tion of the Clean Air Act which authorizes state implementation 
plans also 'authorizes the land use controls.51 In fact, land use con-
trols seem to be the most effective technique for achieving non-
degradation. 
The more traditional pollution control techniques attempt to re-
duce emissions from a single source. To a certain extent traditional 
techniques, like the new source emission standards of the Clean Air 
Act,52 help to prevent deterioration of existing air quality in that 
they require specified control technology in any new source.53 How-
ever, a collection of new sources, each of which complies with new 
source standards, can pollute the air because the new source stan-
dards are not "no-discharge" standards,54 as in the FWPCA. Thus, 
a group of new sources, all emitting relatively low levels of pollution, 
can cumulatively create deterioration of air quality. Herein lies the 
necessity for land use controls which deal with groups of pollution 
sources and patterns of development. 
The key to achieving non-degradation of clean air, then, is some 
type of land use control based on air quality considerations. This 
type of land use control is generally called air quality zoning, and 
it is designed to control air quality by regulating the use of the 
subjacent land. Air has a certain capacity to assimilate contami-
nants without becoming polluted. Up to this point, the ambient air 
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cleans itself; beyond this point the air quality deteriorates as emis-
sions increase. 
The key to air quality zoning is the assimilative capacity of the 
air column above the specific area of land. Until assimilative capac-
ity has been reached, new development will not harm air quality. If 
this capacity has been reached, then further development will de-
grade air quality. Further development will be forbidden, under a 
non-degradation policy, unless there is technology available to make 
existing emiesions cleaner. Of course, air quality zoning could also 
be based on an allowable percentage of degradation of the air col-
umn. The principle of air quality zoning, in any case, is the relation-
ship of new development and new uses of land to the assimilative 
capacity of the ambient air. 
Under Section 11055 of the Clean Air Act, which requires each 
state to prepare an implementation plan, the federal government 
has an opportunity to become involved in air quality zoning. The 
Administrator of EPA is to approve the plan only if it meets certain 
requirements, one of which is that it include land use and transpor-
tation controls as may be necessary to achieve primary and second-
ary ambient air quality standards. However, when a state does not 
act to promulgate an approvable plan, the Administrator is re-
quired, and presumably is authorized, to promulgate a plan for the 
state.56 Since one of the requirements of an approvable plan is the 
inclusion of land use and transportation controls,57 the Administra-
tor must therefore be required to promulgate58 land use and trans-
portation controls when a state does not do SO.59 
However, this degree of federal involvement is inconsistent with 
the balance of state and federal roles envisioned by the general 
language of the Act's introductory section,60 which states that "the 
prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary 
responsibility of states and local governments."61 Under the Act, the 
role of the federal government is seen as "Federal financial assis-
tance and leadership [which] is essential for the development of 
cooperative Federal, State, regional and local programs to prevent 
and control air pollution. "62 As in earlier legislation, federal assis-
tance includes a national research and development program,63 and 
incentives to establish regional air pollution control programs.64 
By granting the federal government the power to promulate land 
use controls when a state does not do so, Section 110 goes beyond 
the apparent intent of the introductory section. However, there is 
an acceptable rationale for this grant of authority. State govern-
ments may be reluctant to impose controls which are inconvenient 
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or expensive. The state governments may favor clean air, but they 
may decide that economic progress is as important as clean air. 
Indeed, state governments may decide that the best interests of the 
state demand industrial expansion at the expense of clean air; they 
may see clean air as a luxury rather than a necessity. 
In order to avoid the ineffectiveness of prior air pollution legisla-
tion which depended solely on state initiatives, the federal govern-
ment needs the authority to impose pollution controls. Effective air 
pollution control depends on a balance of state decision-making and 
action and a clear federal presence, which Section 110 attempts to 
establish. Although Section 110 may be inconsistent with the intro-
ductory section, the scheme of Section 110 is necessary to the effec-
tiveness of the pollution controls it authorizes. 
However, the grant of federal authority to impose land use con-
trols potentially authorizes federal intrusion into areas which have 
previously been considered to be beyond federal control. Regulation 
of local development strategies is not within the scope of federal 
power, unless such an intrastate activity has interstate impact. On 
the other hand, the federal power to control air pollution, derived 
from the commerce clause, is potentially broad and flexible. Such 
power could accomodate the extension of federal influence into land 
use planning, given the interstate ramifications of air pollution, the 
previous inability of the states individually to solve the problem, 
and the critical relationship between air pollution and land develop-
ment. 
The scope of the authority under the Clean Air Act to impose land 
use controls is currently in doubt. The exact wording of the statute 
connects the land use power with the attainment of primary and 
secondary standards. It requires "other measures as may be neces-
sary to insure attainment and maintenance of such primary or sec-
ondary standards, including but not limited to, land use and trans-
portation controls." (emphasis added).65 The Fri decision, however, 
suggests that the federal power under the Clean Air Act can be 
exercised in order to keep clean air clean as well as to achieve pri-
mary and secondary standards.66 
Although the statute clearly does not connect land use regulation 
with non-degradation, the Fri decision makes this connection neces-
sary for two reasons, if the court's mandate is to be followed. First, 
the best, if not the only method of achieving non-degradation is 
some kind of land use control. Second, the Fri opinion specified 
implementation plans as the vehicle for achieving non-degradation, 
ane the Clean Air Act specifically connects land use controls with 
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implementation plans. Arguably, then, despite Section 110's clear 
language, Fri extends the land use power to the achievement of non-
degradation. 
Indeed, EPA reacted to the decision by issuing a set of proposals 
for planning state development to insure prevention of significant 
deteriorationY However, in proposing these regulations, EPA em-
phasized that there had not been a definitive judicial resolution of 
the issue of whether the Clean Air Act requires prevention of signifi-
cant deterioration. EPA is currently of the view that Section 110 of 
the Act requires it to approve state plans which attain and maintain 
ambient air quality standards and no more. 68 
Despite its opinion that Fri is not definitive, in July, 1973, EPA 
did suggest four alternative schemes for deterioration control: an air 
quality increment plan; an emission limitation plan; a local defini-
tion plan; and an area classification plan.69 
Recently, EPA has abandoned these proposals in favor of an even 
more flexible plan, which leaves all decisionmaking up to the 
states. 70 The new plan would require states to classify land into one 
of three zones. Zone I would encompass counties where develop-
ment is not likely to occur or where it is desirable to protect pristine 
air. Zone II would include counties where modest changes in air 
quality would be tolerated. Zone III would encompass urban areas 
where the air quality is better than secondary standards. For Zone 
III areas, EPA would allow pollution up to secondary standards. For 
Zone I and II areas, EPA would set specific amounts by which 
pollution could increase from existing base levels. 
The essence of the proposal is state designation of zones. In effect 
there is no federal standard as such. States would be free to select 
non-degradation or a less stringent standard of air quality. The 
EP A's proposal would allow deterioration unless the state chooses 
otherwise. Thus the EPA's proposal does not assure that significant 
deterioration will not occur, and this assurance is what Fri requires. 
The proposal marks a retreat to the scheme of federal-state res-
ponsibilities under prior air pollution legislation. The federal gov-
ernment suggests a scheme of control; and the states choose, with-
out compulsion, whether to adopt the scheme. Certainly, this ap-
proach minimizes federal intrusion into local matters. If the state 
wants federal advice or funding, the state requests the federal pres-
ence; otherwise, the state is on its own. Indeed, the philosophy 
behind this proposal, federal help at state request, is the philosophy 
embodied in the proposed National Land Use Act, which is the first 
significant national planning legislation.71 Certainly state responsi-
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bility and decision making should be primary, but in order to insure 
that significant deterioration will not occur, there should be stronger 
federal requirements. If Fri is to be followed, the federal role should 
be more forceful than it seems to be under the EPA proposal in order 
to encourage both cooperative and non-cooperative states to act. 
TIL LAND USE CONTROLS FOR PREVENTION OF DETERIORATION 
If land use controls are used for the prevention of significant 
deterioration, that use raises important constitutional and policy 
issues. Since federal land use planning is necessary and proper to 
control the interstate aspects of air pollution, Section 110 of the 
Clean Air Act is an appropriate exercise of the power of Congress 
under the commerce clause.72 However, federal land use planning 
may infringe other constitutional limitations on federal power, 
namely the Fifth Amendment's prohibition of unlawful takings. 
The Constitution is no barrier to the use of land use controls to 
promote environmental concerns. Indeed, recent cases have specifi-
cally upheld land use controls based on environmental factors. In 
the 1973 case of In re Spring Valley Development,73 the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Maine sustained the constitutionality of that 
state's Site Location of Development Law.74 The law requires per-
sons intending to construct or operate a development which may 
substantially affect the local environment to notify the State Envi-
ronmental Improvement Commission of their plans. If the Com-
mission determines that a hearing is necessary, the developer has 
the burden of satisfying the Commission that the development will 
not substantially affect the environment or pose a threat to the 
public's health, safety, or general welfare. If the development 
threatens the environment, it will be restricted. 
In determining the constitutionality of the State's exercise of 
power under the law in the Spring Valley case, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Maine found it "indisputable that the limitation of use of 
property for the purpose of preserving from unreasonable destruc-
tion the quality of air, soil, and water for the protection of the public 
health is within the police power."75 The court asserted that this 
principle is "self-evident" in these times of increased awareness of 
the relationship of the environment to human health and welfare. 78 
Thus Spring Valley holds that the protection of environmental 
quality is a state interest which justifies restrictions on the use of 
land. In fact, the Clean Air Act itself espouses the Spring Valley 
philosophy. The Act acknowledges that air quality is a problem with 
which the government must be concerned;77 and it authorizes land 
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use controls as one possible solution.78 In general, then, zoning or 
restriction of land use to protect air quality seems to be a constitu-
tional exercise of governmental power. 
Air quality zoning to achieve primary and secondary air quality 
standards is authorized by Section 110 of the Clean Air Act. 79 This 
type of regulation similarly violates no constitutional principle. The 
police power concerns of public health and welfare justify zoning 
ordinances which necessarily limit the rights of land owners. In 
1926, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the constitu-
tionality of a comprehensive zoning ordinance in the case of Euclid 
u. Ambler Realty.8o The Court stated that the governmental power 
to interfere with the rights of the landowner by restricting the char-
acter of the use of his land through zoning is valid only if it bears a 
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general 
welfare. 81 Air quality zoning to achieve primary and secondary stan-
dards is, by the definition of primary and secondary standards, 
regulation to protect public health and welfare. It is therefore a 
valid exercise of governmental power. 
The Clean Air Act does not explicitly authorize land use control 
through air quality zoning to prevent significant deterioration of air 
quality. As has been discussed, this authorization can be inferred 
from the Fri decision because air quality zoning would seem to be 
the primary method of achieving non-degradation of clean air.82 
However, air quality zoning to achieve non-degradation may be an 
unconstitutional exercise of governmental power. In the definitional 
framework of the Clean Air Act, controls which go beyond the 
achievement of secondary standards are controls protecting the aes-
thetic quality of the air. 
By definition, air meeting primary ambient air quality standards 
protects the public health;83 air meeting secondary standards pro-
tects the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse 
effects.84 Furthermore, public welfare is a broad concept and within 
the Clean Air Act specifically "includes, but is not limited to, effects 
on soils, water, crops, vegetation, man-made materials, animals, 
wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate, damage to and deteriora-
tion of property, and hazards to transportation, as well as effects on 
economic values and on personal well-being."85 As EPA itself has 
stated, "the basis for preventing significant deterioration therefore 
lies in a desire to protect aesthetic, scenic and recreational values, 
particularly in rural areas."86 Thus land use controls for the preven-
tion of significant deterioration would be based on goals definition-
ally not related to public health or welfare. These controls fall into 
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the category of aesthetic zoning regulations. 
Aesthetic zoning, under certain circumstances, is not unconstitu-
tional. The early cases consistently held that aesthetic zoning was 
beyond the police power of the state, and therefore an unjust taking 
by the stateY Recently many courts have been willing to find that 
aesthetic values are a valid legislative concern and that reasonable 
legislation to promote aesthetic ends is a permissible exercise of the 
police power. 88 
The case of Berman v. Parker89 involved the condemnation of 
plaintiff's property under the District of Columbia Redevelopment 
Act of 1945. It is important to note that Berman involved the power 
of the federal government.90 The plaintiff argued that taking his 
property to develop a better balanced, more attractive community 
was a taking for a non-public purpose and was therefore unconstitu-
tional. The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed, and held 
that the purpose was public and the taking constitutional. As Mr. 
Justice Douglas stated in the majority opinion in Berman: "The 
concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive .... The val-
ues it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well 
as monetary . . . . If those who govern the District of Columbia 
decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as 
sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the 
way."91 Thus Berman stands for the proposition that aesthetic con-
cerns can be a legitimate governmental purpose. 
The criteria for determining the validity of aesthetic zoning regu-
lations have not been decided in an air quality zoning case. There-
fore, it is necessary to refer to traditional aesthetic zoning cases, 
although the facts differ from the facts which would be involved in 
an air quality zoning case. A regulation forbidding unsightly 
clotheslines, for example, is hardly comparable to a regulation for-
bidding the building of a new power plant in the Berkshire Moun-
tains of Massachusetts. Nevertheless, since there is no case law on 
aesthetic air quality zoning, the clear principles announced in the 
traditional zoning cases at least provide a guide for evaluating aes-
thetic air quality zoning regulations. 
The cases upholding aesthetic zoning have required that the aes-
thetic considerations relate to health or welfare considerations. A 
typical case is People v. Stover, decided by the New York Court of 
Appeals.92 At issue was a city ordinance prohibiting clotheslines in 
a front or side yard abutting the street. In upholding the validity of 
the ordinance, the Court of Appeals concluded that a zoning law is 
not necessarily invalid because its primary, if not its exclusive 
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objective, is the aesthetic enhancement of the particular area in-
volved, so long as it is related, if only generally, to the economic and 
cultural setting of the regulating community.93 
In a more recent case, the same court upheld an ordinance re-
stricting non-accessory signs.94 Here, the Court of Appeals empha-
sized that not just any aesthetic consideration can justify state regu-
lation. Rather, only aesthetic considerations which bear substan-
tially on the economic, social, and cultural patterns of a district can 
validly support such regulation. us The principle, then, is that aes-
thetic zoning is valid when it relates to the welfare of the community 
involved. 
Air quality zoning to prevent significant deterioration does not 
seem to satisfy this condition of validity. By definition, any zoning 
provisions set forth by an implementation plan under the Clean Air 
Act will be based on exclusively aesthetic considerations because air 
meeting secondary standards is protected against all known or an-
ticipated adverse effects of air pollution. Non-degradation does re-
late to the public welfare because pristine air is good for people. 
However, the definitional framework of the Clean Air Act precludes 
connection of the aesthetic considerations of non-degradation with 
health and welfare considerations. 
Furthermore, there are strong arguments that these aesthetic con-
siderations relate adversely to the economic welfare of the region 
affected. Non-degradation could severely restrict development in 
all but the polluted areas of the country. At the least, a national 
policy of preventing significant detrioration would have a substan-
tial impact on the nature, extent and location of future industrial, 
commercial and residential development throughout the country. 98 
To use the example quoted by Administrator Ruckelshaus in the 
1972 hearings, non-degradation in a clean area could require EPA 
to deny a state the right to put up a coal-fired powerplant. 97 Under 
the principles which upheld the clothesline ordinance in Stover, 
this EPA requirement could be seen as an impermissible aesthetic 
zoning regulation because it is definition ally unrelated to health and 
welfare considerations. 
Thus air quality zoning to achieve non-degradation could inhibit 
the economic welfare of a state which is relatively undeveloped. If 
such state desires to encourage industrial and commercial develop-
ment, it will not be anxious to impose strict development controls 
for the purpose of keeping its air pure forever. With its citizens' 
economic welfare in mind, the state might make the judgment that 
some development is worth some deterioration of air quality. How-
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ever, concerning the same state, the EPA according to Fri must 
insure that no significant deterioration of air quality occurs. If the 
state is not preventing air quality deterioration, EPA must promul-
gate regulations to do so. 
In such a head-on conflict of state and federal decisions, theoreti-
cally the state has the stronger position. Given the aesthetic zoning 
nature of land use controls for the prevention of significant deterio-
ration, a state could successfully argue that such aesthetic consider-
ations are wholly unrelated to the economic welfare of the state and 
therefore do not support valid regulation. The Clean Air Act argua-
bly authorizes land use controls to prevent deterioration, but this 
authorization would not make the controls valid in this case. On the 
other hand, non-degradation to the maximum extent possible 
should be the policy of the Clean Air Act; and land use controls to 
implement this policy are essential. 
CONCLUSION 
In order to insure the validity of land use controls to achieve non-
degradation, the Clean Air Act requires a change. The change would 
have to replace primary and secondary standards as the ultimate 
goals of the Act. As has been shown, the definitional connection of 
primary and secondary standards potentially invalidates land-use 
controls which go beyond secondary standards. 
To accomplish the necessary change, Congress must clearly state 
that non-degradation is the goal of the Clean Air Act, just as no-
discharge is the goal of the FWPCA.98 It is not necessary to abandon 
ambient air quality standards. They could be retained as interim 
goals and measures of program effectiveness, as in the FWPCA.99 
However, ambient air quality standards should not be rigidly and 
exclusively connected with the protection of health and welfare from 
all known and anticipated adverse effects.IOO 
This proposed change would prevent "the graying of America"lol 
because it would establish non-degradation as the national goal of 
air pollution control and authorize control techniques to achieve 
this goal. However, it potentially vests in the federal government 
tremendous decisionmaking power over state development. Con-
gress may have the constitutional power to do this, but there are 
policy reasons for limiting federal power in local development deci-
sions. Pristine air is probably not worth such an extension of federal 
power. 
It may be possible to achieve non-degradation through a more 
moderate approach, along the lines of the EPA proposals.102 Such an 
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approach would set a flexible concept of non-degradation as the 
goal. The federal government could set guidelines which would 
make air quality a factor in land use decisions; it could help to pay 
for land use planning. However, it would not be authorized to force 
the states to accept federal decisions on planning and development. 
Rather it could condition funding on the degree to which the states 
comply with the policy of non-degradation. The states would thus 
have the final decisionmaking power. This approach would not in-
sure that significant deterioration would not occur, but it would 
probably prod the states into taking some action to keep clean air 
clean. 
The federal government should have a strong hortatory role in 
land use planning for air quality, but not the final word. However, 
the scope of federal land use planning power is a policy determina-
tion for Congress to make. As the Clean Air Act and its meagre case 
law now stand, the scope of this federal power is not clear, and land 
use controls for air quality are being ignored. If Congress acts to 
clarify the land use power of the Clean Air Act, then it is likely that 
the important strategy of land use controls will be implemented. 
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